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INSURANCE
I. OFFSET OF MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE AGAINST LIABILITY
For a relatively small additional premium, most automobile
liability insurance policies now contain medical payments cover-
age in which the insurer agrees to advance an injured party's
medical expenses within the specified limits. Many insurers in-
clude additional provisions within medical payments coverage
which allow the insurer to become subrogated to the injured
party's right of recovery against the tortfeasor.1 In Harrington v.
Edwards2 the supreme court recently examined the novel issue of
whether an insurer may credit or offset the amount of advanced
medical payments against an injured party's settlement or recov-
ery. Harrington, a guest-passenger, was injured in an automobile
accident in which the insured driver was killed. In a subsequent
suit against the administratrix of decedent's estate, Harrington
recovered a verdict in the amount of $5,412.05.1 Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Company, the decedent's insurance carrier, had
advanced Harrington $3,488.95 under the medical payments pro-
vision of its policy. Although Nationwide's policy required Har-
rington to execute a written agreement that any advances would
be applied to offset any subsequent claim or recovery,4 the com-
pany did not obtain such an agreement. Additionally, Nation-
wide's medical payments coverage contained a standard subroga-
tion clause which purportedly gave the insurer the right to offset
medical payments.5
1. See Travelers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
2. 262 S.C. 263, 203 S.E.2d 691 (1974).
3. The jury award represents the exact amount of Harrington's medical bills plus his
lost wages. Brief for Appellant at 4.
4. The policy provision agreed to advance medical payments to any person injured
in an accident involving the insured automobile
[p]rovided that no such payment shall be made . . . unless the person to or
for whom such payment is made shall have executed a written agreement that
the amount of such payment shall be applied toward the settlement of any
claim, or the satisfaction of any judgment for damages entered in his favor,
against any person entitled to protection because of bodily injury . ...
Record at 6-7.
5. The subrogation clause provided that
[iun the event of payment. . . of this endorsement. . . the Company shall be
subrogated to the extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery which the
injured person or anyone receiving such payment may have against any person
1
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It was agreed and stipulated by counsel prior to trial that
Nationwide would receive credit for any and all advance pay-
ments subject to the policy provisions relating to medical pay-
ments coverage. In return, Nationwide agreed not to object to the
introduction into evidence of Harrington's medical bills. All par-
ties agreed that $2,488.95 advanced to Harrington above the lim-
its of Nationwide's medical payments coverage was a true ad-
vance and that the verdict, if any, would be reduced by that
amount. The remaining $1,000 advancement was at issue. Na-
tionwide claimed that its policy provisions allowed it to offset the
full amount advanced. Harrington contended that he was a
stranger to Nationwide's policy, was not bound by its subrogation
provisions, and that the $1,000 could not be offset against a ver-
dict under the policy's liability provisions. At pretrial, the parties
agreed that the trial court should determine whether the verdict,
if any, would be further reduced by the $1,000 amount.
After the jury verdict, the trial court refused to allow Nation-
wide to offset the advanced medical payment in issue because
Harrington was not bound by the insurance contract or by a
written agreement with Nationwide.' In a divided opinion, the
supreme court reversed the trial court and allowed Nationwide to
offset all its advances against the verdict. Justice Littlejohn, writ-
ing for the majority, noted that Nationwide's medical payments
coverage was not required by statute and that the deceased driver
had voluntarily purchased the coverage to benefit passengers in
the insured automobile.7 Harrington, therefore, was a third party
beneficiary of the insurance contract whose recovery was limited
to the amount stipulated in the contract provisions.
8
In oral argument, Harrington's counsel conceded that Na-
tionwide was under no obligation to advance medical payments
unless Harrington agreed in writing that such advancements
would be credited against ultimate recovery and that he would
have been bound by his written agreement had he executed one.'
As a result of these admissions, Justice Littlejohn narrowed the
or organization and such person shall execute and deliver instruments and pa-
pers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such person shall
do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
Record at 7.
6. Record at 9-10.
7. 262 S.C. at 266, 203 S.E.2d at 692.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 267, 203 S.E.2d at 692-93.
1975]
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issue of the appeal to the single question of whether Nationwide's
waiver of the required written agreement also waived its right to
offset. In answering the question in the negative, Justice Little-
john relied upon his conception of the intent of the contracting
parties."0 Although Harrington was not a party to the contract,
the terms of the contract indicate that the parties intended to
condition his acceptance of medical payments on the insurer's
right to offset."
Justices Brailsford and Moss concurred in the result reached
by Justice Littlejohn but maintained that the suit was not an
action on the insurance contract. Instead, both viewed the con-
trolling questions as "whether the administratrix is entitled to
credit for the advance payment of plaintiff's medical expense."' 2
Relying upon the Delaware Superior Court's opinion in
Yarrington v. Thornburg,1 both indicated that the administratrix
could receive a credit for the advanced medical payments.'4 Since
the deceased driver had created the fund from which the pay-
ments arose, his estate should be able to claim an advantage from
the premiums paid to the insurer." Since the estate earned the
credit through the payment of premiums and would receive no
windfall by its credit, the collateral source rule would not be
violated and Harrington would be precluded from receiving a
double recovery for his medical bills.'6
Justice Bussey, with whom Justice Lewis concurred, dis-
10. Id. at 267-68, 203 S.E.2d at 693.
11. Brief for Appellant at 9.
12. 262 S.C. at 269, 203 S.E.2d at 693.
13. 205 A.2d 1 (Del. Sup. 1964). In Yarrington an automobile driver was sued by a
guest-passenger to recover for injuries sustained in an accident. Despite the absence of
any policy provisions requiring deduction of advance medical payments from damages
recovered by the insured party, the court allowed the tortfeasor to credit the payments
made by his insurer.
14. 262 S.C. at 269, 203 S.E.2d at 693.
15. Id. See Brief for Appellant at 12-13.
16. 262 S.C. at 269, 203 S.E.2d at 693. Justices Brailsford and Moss apparently would
allow an injured party to obtain a double recovery for his medical bills in some circum-
stances where an insurer refused to comply with its contractual obligation to make medi-
cal payments after the injured party has recovered upon or settled his tort claim. In
Moorman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Va. 244, 148 S.E.2d 874 (1966), the Virginia
Supreme Court allowed a guest-passenger to recover medical expenses from the insurer
after the guest-passenger had obtained a settlement with the insured. The court noted the
absence of language in the policy which reduced or limited the insurer's liability under
the medical payments coverage if recovery resulted from other policy provisions. Since the
insurer agreed to assume a distinct and specific coverage under the medical coverage
[Vol. 27
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sented,'7 emphasizing several troublesome facts which the other
opinions ignore. Initially, Harrington received a verdict which
was limited to the exact amount of his medical bills and lost
wages. The size of the amount advanced by Nationwide prior to
trial, however, creates the inference that Harrington sustained
serious injuries in the accident. 8 Since no award for pain or suf-
fering was evident, Justice Bussey concluded that the small
amount of recovery "gives rise to the inference that the jury com-
promised the issue of liability by compensating Mr. Harrington
only in part for his injuries and damage."" Additionally, no indi-
cation appears in the record to explain why Nationwide did not
request a written agreement from Harrington before it advanced
medical payments. The suspect nature of the insurer's actions
convinced Justice Bussey that its waiver of a written agreement
should also act as a waiver of the ability to credit or offset ad-
vanced payments against the verdict."0
The divergent opinions expressed by the supreme court in
Harrington reflect the conflicting views adopted by other jurisdic-
tions which have faced the identical issue. A number of jurisdic-
tions have allowed insurers to credit disbursements under medi-
cal payment provisions against the damages to which an injured
party is entitled on the grounds that the injured party should not
be unjustly enriched by a double recovery on his medical bills.2'
provisions in return for an increased payment, the injured passenger could recover under
the provisions which were viewed as similar to a personal accident policy. See, e.g.,
Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 275 Minn. 328, 146 N.W.2d 861 (1966); Severson
v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953). Cf. Blocker v. Sterling,
251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226 (1968). See Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1115 (1967).
17. 262 S.C. at 270-72, 203 S.E.2d at 694-95.
18. Id. at 270, 203 S.E.2d at 694.
19. Id.
20. Justice Bussey verbalized his suspicions and reasoning in the following manner:
Nationwide's efforts to arrive at an adjustment favorable to it were. . . unsuc-
cessful and it now asks this Court to restore it to the same position it would have
occupied had it laid all of its cards on top of the table in dealing with Harrington
and taken the written agreement in accordance with the proviso. I agree that
each case should be determined on the basis of the policy provisions and the
facts and circumstances involved. As I see it Nationwide clearly waived the
proviso, deliberately making its own bed in which we should leave it lying.
262 S.C. at 271, 203 S.E.2d at 694.
21. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Shaver Transp. Co., 263 F. Supp. 47 (D. Ore. 1967);
Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965); Cabellero v. Farmers Ins. Group, 10
Ariz. App. 61, 455 P.2d 1011 (1969); Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d 1 (Del. Sup. 1964);
Sims v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1965) (dictum); Thompson v. Milan, 115
Ga. App. 396, 154 S.E.2d 721 (1967); Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962);
Hamilton v. Slover, 440 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1969); Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161,125 S.E.2d
754 (1962); Chambers v. Pinson, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 163, 216 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio App. 1966).
1975]
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A number of other jurisdictions allow the injured party a double
recovery without crediting amounts advanced under medical pay-
ments coverage.2 Such jurisdictions commonly view medical pay-
ment provisions as a separate accident insurance policy under
which an injured party may seek a separate recovery; to hold
otherwise would allow insurers to enrich themselves unjustly by
charging two premiums but providing only a single benefit.2 The
conflicting views of the offset issue in other jurisdictions may
largely be explained by the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case and the specific resolution each court determined to
be equitable in light of those facts and circumstances.
The conflicting views in Harrington indicate that the issue
of credit for medical payments may still be an open one in South
Carolina. The result reached in that case, however, is arguably
correct. Since the basic purpose of insurance is indemnification,
double recovery for medical expenses is inconsistent. If an insured
voluntarily elects to purchase medical payment coverage, his in-
tention is to provide an injured party some minimal protection
for medical expenses if no negligence is present. If the insured
party is negligent, then the injured party is afforded full protec-
tion up to the liability limits of the policy.
2 '4
If credit for medical payments is allowed, care should be
taken to insure that a jury's verdict truly reflects the damages
sustained. Although the verdict in Harrington creates an infer-
ence of a compromise verdict," the record does not indicate how
Nationwide's claim for a credit may have influenced the verdict.
To avoid prejudice, proper procedure would be a postjudgment
motion for a credit toward satisfaction of the judgment. Such a
procedure would shorten the trial and prevent interruptions with
extraneous insurance matters. 8 If an injured party elects to sue
for general damages only and makes no specific claim for medical
22. See, e.g., Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961) (applying Delaware
law prior to Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d 1 (Del. Sup. 1964)); Blocker v. Sterling,
251 Md. 55, 246 A.2d 226 (1968); Beschnett v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 275 Minn. 328,
146 N.W.2d 861 (1966); Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961); Sparks v. Dalton,
458 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis.
488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953).
23. Brief for Respondent at 12, Harrington v. Edwards, 262 S.C. 263, 203 S.E.2d 691
(1974).
24. See Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962).
25. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
26. See Chambers v. Pinson, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 163, 216 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio App. 1966).
[Vol. 27
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expenses, then a postjudgment motion for credit should be de-
nied.
II. CANCELLATION BY SUBSTITUTION
Cancellation of a policy of insurance arises from a variety of
sources. 7 A number of older cases support the proposition that,
when an insured unilaterally secures other insurance covering the
same ,property, he has cancelled the existing policy by substitut-
ing another. 2 In McCormack v. Equitable Fire Insurance Co.2"
the South Carolina Supreme Court apparently adopted the rule
of cancellation by substitution. In Emmanuel Baptist Church v.
Southern Mutual Church Insurance Co." the court questioned
the soundness of the McCormack rule but declined to offer an
alternative.3 ' Instead, the court was content to distinguish
McCormack by noting that the insured in Emmanuel intended to
27. Cancellation of insurance policies may be affected by statutory provisions, the
terms and stipulations of the insurance contract, the mutual consent or acquiescence of
the parties, the existence of fraud or misrepresentation, and the insolvency or dissolution
of the insurance company. See generally 43 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance §§ 397 et seq. (1969).
28. See, e.g., Wells Petroleum Co. v. Fidelty-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 739
(D. Ill. 1954); Strauss v. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 283, 22 P.2d 582
(1933); Bache v. Great Lakes Ins. Co., 151 Wash. 494, 276 P. 549 (1929).
29. 102 S.C. 473, 86 S.E. 1059 (1915). The insured purchased fire insurance through
an agent who represented several insurance companies. The first insurer asked to be
relieved of its risk and the agent issued a second fire insurance policy to the insured who
immediately returned the original policy. The second insurer, Equitable Fire Insurance
Company, decided to cancel its policy and notified the agent. The agent thereupon simul-
taneously issued a third policy in Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Insurance Company and requested
immediate return of Equitable's policy which remained in effect 5 days after the notice
of cancellation. Before the elapse of the required 5 days, fire destroyed the insured prem-
ises. Consequently, the insured held two fire insurance policies, both of which were in
effect. Since both companies could not be liable for the loss, the court held that the
insured compromised his claim against Equitable by releasing Fidelity-Phoenix prior to
trial. This reasoning was based on the assumption that the third insurance policy was
meant as a substitute for the second one.
30. 259 S.C. 223, 191 S.E.2d 255 (1972). Southern Mutual was the original insurer of
the church. After extensive additions to the church buildings, Southern accepted a limited
increase in its coverage. While further expansion was underway, Southern indicated an
unwillingness to expand its coverage further. The church subsequently obtained addi-
tional insurance coverage from Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. Since the church
facilities were grossly underinsured, the church was in the process of negotiating a multi-
peril policy with Nationwide in addition to its current coverage. This was accomplished
by an oral binder one day before the insured premises sustained a fire loss. The first
insurer, Southern, contended that Nationwide's policy was a substitution which effected
a voluntary cancellation of their coverage and denied liability.
31. Id. at 231, 191 S.E.2d at 258.
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obtain additional, rather than substitute insurance coverage."
In Tyner v. Cherokee Insurance Co.33 the court rejected the
older rule and announced that "the mere procuring of a policy of
insurance with the intent that it should be substituted for an
existing policy does not effect a cancellation of the existing policy,
unless such substitution is accepted by both the insured and the
insurer.'"" In Tyner the insured owned a building in Charleston
which was insured by Old Charleston Company, Ltd., for a 3-
year term. Before the expiration of the 3-year period, the insured
secured another policy issued by Cherokee Insurance Company
covering the same premises. Although the insured intended to
substitute Cherokee's policy for that of Old Charleston, neither
company knew of the other's policy and both considered its own
policy in effect. The insured premises were severely damaged by
fire and the insured subsequently brought an action against both
insurers to recover the loss.
The trial court held that both policies were in effect and that
the loss should be prorated between the insurers in proportion to
the amount of coverage afforded by their respective policies. In
affirming the lower court, the supreme court recognized that can-
cellation of an insurance policy by a method different from that
set forth in the policy requires mutual assent. 5
Whether cancellation by mutual agreement has been effected
depends on the intention of the parties as evidenced by their
acts, conduct and words, taken in connection with the attendant
circumstances. There must be a meeting of minds, or mutual
assent, to constitute a valid cancellation, and each party must
act with knowledge of the material facts."
Consequently, the court felt that the sounder rule was that can-
cellation of an insurance policy by substitution should similarly
be based upon mutual assent and may not be unilaterally effected
32. Id.
33. 262 S.C. 462, 205 S.E.2d 380 (1974).
34. Id. at 465, 205 S.E.2d at 381.
35. Id. at 466, 205 S.E.2d at 381. See Lundy V. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 1, 100
S.E.2d 544 (1957); Dell v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 213 S.C. 593, 50 S.E.2d 923 (1948).
36. 262 S.C. at 465, 205 S.E.2d at 381, quoting Dill v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co.,
213 S.C. 593, 600, 50 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1948). In Dill, the policy provisions allowed either
the insured or the insurer the right to cancel the contract of insurance upon proper notice
to the other party and without the other party's consent. The specific issue involved in
Dill was whether the policy terms constituted the exclusive method of cancellation.
[Vol. 27
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unless the policy provisions otherwise allow.37
In rejecting, sub silentio,35 the rule of substitution found in
McCormack, the court adopted a position in accord with a grow-
ing number of states. 9 The requirement of mutual consent to
effect cancellation is consistent with the principles of contract
law.
It comes to this-an insurance policy is a contract; a contract
may be . . . terminated in accordance with the provisions
thereof or by mutual consent, a meeting of the minds, but one
of the parties may not terminate it without the assent of the
other unless the contract so provides.4
Not only does the mutual assent rule comport with basic contract
principles, it also obviates the necessity for trial courts to delve
into and determine the uncommunicated intent of insureds who
hold dual policy coverage. In requiring the insurer to contribute
a prorated share of the loss, an entirely equitable result is
reached."
III. SOUTH CAROLINA RETALIATORY STATUTE
Most states have a retaliatory statute which protects domes-
tic insurers within the state and insures fair treatment of domes-
tic insurers in other states.42 Such statutes create a quasi-tariff
around the borders of the taxing state and establish a price of
37. 262 S.C. at 465, 205 S.E.2d at 381.
38. The court in Tyner never mentioned the McCormack decision.
39. The substitution rule has been repudiated or rejected by several states in the past
decade. See, e.g., National Investors Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 359 F.2d
203 (10th Cir. 1966); Mutual Creamery Ins. Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp.
337 (D. Minn. 1969); Northern Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P.2d 347 (1966);
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Founders' Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 157, 25 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1962);
M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southwest Baptist College, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1964); New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Cruise Shops, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 60, 323 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1971);
Baysdon v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 181, 130 S.E.2d 311 (1963); Scheel
v. German-American Ins. Co., 228 Pa. 44, 76 A. 507 (1910).
40. Baysdon v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 181, 188, 130 S.E.2d 311, 316
(1963).
41. The result of McCormack may still be possible where an insured elects to release,
waive, or otherwise terminate a portion of his insurance coverage after loss occurs, the loss
falling upon the insured pro tanto. See Baysdon v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 259
N.C. at 189, 130 S.E.2d at 317.
42. Note, A Review of Retaliatory Laws, 6 S.C.L.Q. 221 (1953-54). Retaliatory stat-
utes have existed for over one hundred years with the New Hampshire statute of 1852
being the first. See Haverhill Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 42 N.H. 547, 80 Am. Dec. 123 (1861).
1975]
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admission for foreign insurers seeking to transact business within
the state.43 Retaliatory legislation is a misnomer since "the so-
called retaliatory clauses in insurance statutes are ...based
upon principles of 'comity,' and are designed to create substantial
equality of burdens upon foreign and domestic corporations.""
To encourage equality, foreign insurers doing business within the
taxing state face the same tax burden as domestic insurers doing
business in the foreign state.45 Since retaliatory statutes are recog-
nized as penal in nature, they are strictly construed."
The South Carolina Retaliatory Act is typical of many such
statutes and provides that
[w]henever the laws of any other state of the United States
shall require of insurance companies chartered by this State and
having agencies in such other state, or of the agents thereof, any
deposit of securities in such state for the protection of policy-
holders or otherwise or any payment of penalties, certificates of
authority, license fees or otherwise, greater than the amount
required for such purposes from similar companies of other
states by the then existing laws of this State, all such similar
companies of such states establishing or having theretofore es-
tablished an agency or agencies in this State shall make the
same deposit for a like purpose with the Commissioner and pay
to the Commissioner, for penalties, certificates of authority, li-
cense fees, filing fees or any other fees, an amount equal to the
amount of such charges imposed by the laws of such state upon
companies of this state and the agencies thereof.
Whenever the laws of any other state of the United States
or the regulation or action of any public official of such other
state shall subject insurance companies chartered by this State
to any restrictions, obligations, conditions or penalties for the
privilege of doing business in such other state which are greater
than those required of similar insurers organized or domiciled in
such other state by or in this State for the privilege of doing
business herein, then all similar insurers organized or domiciled
in such other state shall be subjected to such greater require-
ments imposed by or in such other state upon similar insurers
of this State. Provided, however, that all license fees and
43. 6 S.C.L.Q. at 221.
44. Employers Gas. Co. v. Hobbs, 152 Kan. 815, 107 P.2d 715 (1941). Contra, State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Fidelity & Gas. Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N.E. 658 (1892).
45. Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374
(1972).
46. Id.
[Vol. 27
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charges made pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the
extent of investment credits granted by §§ 37-123 and 37-125.11
In Lindsay v. National Old Line Insurance Co." the supreme
court held that a foreign insurer doing business in South Carolina
could not reduce its total tax liability with the use of investment
credits which the statute made otherwise available. National was
a foreign insurer, incorporated under Arkansas law, which was
licensed to do business in South Carolina. Under the applicable
Arkansas statute,49 a South Carolina insurance company would
be taxed in the fixed amount of 2- percent of gross income for
the privilege of doing business in Arkansas. In South Carolina,
all foreign insurers are taxed at a rate of 1 percent of total net
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-132 (Cum. Supp. 1974), as amended, No. 1555, [1972] S.C.
Acts & Jt. Res. 3025. The 1972 amendment added the proviso to the second paragraph of
the statute. The remainder of the second paragraph had previously been added in 1971.
See No. 128, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 102.
48. 262 S.C. 621, 207 S.E.2d 75 (1974).
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2302 (1966) provides in part:
(1) Each authorized foreign or alien insurer, and each formerly authorized
foreign or alien insurer with respect to premiums so received while an authorized
insurer in this State, shall file with the Commissioner on or before March 1 each
year a report in form as prescribed by the Commissioner showing . . . total
direct premium income including policy, membership and other fees, and all
other considerations for insurance, from all kinds and classes of insurance,
whether designated as premium or otherwise, received by it during the preced-
ing calendar year on account of policies and contracts covering property sub-
jects, or risks located, resident, or to be performed in this State (with proper
proportionate allocation of premium as to such persons, property, subjects, or
risks in this State insured under policies or contracts covering persons, property,
subjects, or risks located or resident in more than one state), after deducting
from such total direct premium income dividends and similar returns paid or
credited to policyholders other than as to life insurance, applicable cancella-
tions, returned premiums, the unabsorbed portion of any deposit premium, and
the amount of reduction in or refund of premiums allowed to industrial life
policyholders for payment of premiums direct to an office of the insurer. No
deduction shall be made of the cash surrender values of policies. Considerations
received on annuity contracts shall not be included in total direct premium
income and shall not be subject to tax.
(2) Coincident with the filing of such tax report each such insurer shall
pay to the State Treasurer through the Commissioner, as a tax imposed for the
privilege of transacting business in this State, a tax upon such net premiums
and net considerations, such tax to be computed thereon at the following rates:
(a) As to life insurance and disability insurance, the tax rate shall be two
and one-half (21/2%) per cent.
(b) As to all other kinds of insurance the rate of tax shall be two (2%) per
cent. ...
Arkansas law does not provide for any reduction in tax liability as a result of investment
credits. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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income" plus an additional license fee amounting to 2 percent of
the total net premiums collected in the state .5 The maximum 3
percent tax rate on net premium income, however, can be re-
duced according to the amount of investment credits the foreign
insurer allows to remain within the state." National had rein-
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-128 (1962) provides:
The Commissioner shall require all insurance companies not incorporated under
the laws of this State but doing business in this State, including all domesti-
cated companies and all other companies of any class licensed by such Commis-
sioner other than domestic companies, to pay, in addition to the annual license
fees otherwise provided by law, a graduated license fee in an amount equal to
one percent of the total premiums collected in the State, less return premiums
on risks and less dividends paid or credited to policyholders. But a mutual fire
insurance company of another state, admitted to do business in this State,
employing no agents, writing no business except on the property of its members
and doing business without profit, shall pay annually on or before the first day
of March, in lieu of the fee provided for in the preceding sentence but in addition
to all other license fees which it is required by law to pay, a graduated annual
license fee in an amount equal to one per cent of the premiums and premium
deposits and assessments collected by it in the State during the year ending on
the thirty-first day of December next preceding, after deducting from such
premiums and premium deposits and assessments the so-called dividends or
unused or unabsorbed portion of the premiums and premium deposits and as-
sessments applied or credited in part payment of such premiums or premium
deposits and assessments or returned to policyholders in cash or otherwise dur-
ing the year for which the tax is computed. For the purposes of this section
premiums shall not include considerations received for annuity contracts.
51. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-122 (1962) provides:
In addition to other annual license fees provided by law the Commissioner shall
require each life insurance company of any class licensed by him, not incorpo-
rated under the laws of this State, to pay as an additional and graded license
fee an amount equal to two per cent on the total premiums, that is, total
premium income or total premium receipts from the State, less any dividend
or bonuses paid in cash or applied in abatement of premiums or credited to
policyholders of such company as collected from citizens of or residents of this
State during the time the company has done business in this State since making
the last return for such license fee. For the purposes of this section premiums
shall not include considerations received for annuity contracts.
52. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-123 (1962) provides:
If the executive officer making a return for a company required to pay the
additional fee provided by § 37-122 shall file with the Commissioner a sworn
statement showing that at least one fourth of the reserve on all policies issued
in this State is invested in any or all of the following securities or property, to
wit, (a) notes or bonds of this State or of counties or municipalities of this State
of subdivisions thereof, (b) first mortgage bonds of real estate in this State or
first mortgage bonds of solvent domestic or domesticated corporations whose
improved property is situate entirely within this State and which are owned and
controlled independently of foreign corporations and operated entirely within
the State, (c) average daily balance on deposits in banks of this State main-
tained continuously for twelve months next preceding the date of the return or
11
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vested three-fourths of its reserves within South Carolina and
apparently qualified for a reduced license fee of 1 percent, mak-
ing its total liability only 21 percent of its net income.
National paid what it believed to be its tax liability under
the retaliatory and licensing statutes. The insurance commis-
sioner took the position that National, a foreign insurer, must pay
an additional percent of its gross premium income to satisfy
the requirements of the retaliatory statute. The commissioner
obviously felt that National should pay to South Carolina the
same amount that a South Carolina insurer doing business in
Arkansas would be required to pay. National relied upon opinions
of the South Carolina Attorney General53 which indicated that it
could take advantage of its investment credits to affect tax liabil-
ity despite higher tax rates in the state of its incorporation and
refused the commissioner's demand for an additional payment.
After National's refusal to pay the additional tax, the commis-
sioner filed suit to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the correct
application of the retaliatory statute.
The commissioner moved for summary judgment before
trial, claiming that no genuine issue existed as to any material
fact. 4 National argued that the 1972 amendment55 to the retalia-
tory statute permitting foreign insurers to reduce their license
fees with investment credits was intended to be retroactive in
application. The specific wording of the enactment tends to sup-
port National's assertion and demonstrate legislative intent that
the amended statute should be retroactively applied:
(A) Section 37-132, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962,
as amended, be and the same is hereby further amended by
adding at the end thereof the following: "Provided, However,
that all license fees and charges made pursuant to this Section
(d) any property situate within the State and returned for taxes therein, at the
value at which it is returned, then the additional license fee on premiums col-
lected during the time such investments have been actually made and main-
tained shall be one and three fourths per cent. Under like conditions if such
investment be one half of such reserve, the additional license fee shall be one
and one half per cent. Under like conditions if such investment be three fourths
of such reserve, the additional license fee shall be one and one fourth per cent.
And if the entire reserve be so invested, under like conditions, the additional
license fee on such premium receipts shall be one per cent.
53. See 1965-66 Op. ATr'y GEN. 116; 1964-65 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 163.
54. See S.C. CIR. CT. R. 44. National conceded that it was proper to require payment
of its license fee on the basis of gross income.
55. See note 47 supra, and text accompanying note 56 infra.
1975]
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shall be reduced to the extent of investment credits granted by
Sections 37-123 and 37-125, Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1962."
(B) This enactment is declared to be declaratory of the
existing provisions of Section 37-132.11
The trial court granted the commissioner's motion for sum-
mary jpdgment and ruled that the 1972 amendment must be
applied retrospectively. A majority of the supreme court, affirm-
ing the lower court, agreed with the lower court that its recent
decision in Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
Co." was controlling. In Southern Farm the same majority held
that foreign insurers doing business in South Carolina who qual-
ify for investment credits are still subject to the provisions of the
retaliatory statute. The factual situations in Southern Farm and
National Old Line are virtually identical,58 except that the former
decision was based upon the pre-1972 provisions of the retaliatory
statute 9 Consequently, the Southern Farm court ruled that the
retaliatory insurance law should not be construed so as to defeat
its basic purpose:
If similar investment credit is authorized by the foreign State,
then South Carolina could not retaliate since the taxes imposed
by the foreign State on a South Carolina insurer would not be
greater than the taxes imposed by South Carolina on the foreign
insurer. If similar investment credit is not authorized by the
foreign State, then. . .South Carolina must retaliate since the
taxes imposed by the foreign State on a South Carolina insurer
are greater than the taxes imposed by South Carolina on the
foreign insurer."
56. No. 1555, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3025 (emphasis added).
57. 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972).
58. In Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., a Mississippi insurance corpo-
ration was doing business in South Carolina. The applicable Mississippi law imposed a 3
percent tax on South Carolina insurers transacting business in Mississippi and made no
provision for reduction in that amount as a result of investments in Mississippi securities.
Although Southern Farm had made substantial investments in South Carolina securities
and would normally have been entitled to an investment credit, the supreme court strictly
construed the retaliatory statute, noted the absence of any language indicating legislative
intent to allow reduction of tax liability below that imposed on South Carolina insurers
in foreign states, and held that Southern Farm must pay an amount equal to that which
a South Carolina insurer must pay in Mississippi.
59. See note 47 supra.
60. Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 277-78, 188 S.E.2d
374, 376 (1972).
[Vol. 27
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The court in National Old Line asserted the same rationale to
conclude that South Carolina must retaliate against the higher
Arkansas taxes.'
After the court's decision in Southern Farm, the General
Assembly acted with some dispatch 2 and amended the retalia-
tory statute63 to allow investments in South Carolina securities to
be credited after the retaliatory feature of the statute had been
employed. In holding that this amendment was prospective only,
despite the enactment's contrary language,64 the National Old
Line court, citing the trial judge, observed that
the law is settled by the 1972 decision [Lindsay v. Southern
Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.] until such decision is
reversed or modified .... [Tjhe provision in the 1972 amend-
ment that it "is declared to be declaratory of the existing provi-
sions of Section 37-132" is a legislative attempt to reverse a
decision of the Supreme Court. In effect, the General Assembly
has said as to Lindsay vs. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty In-
surance Company, "We reverse." Under our State Constitution
which provides in Section 14 of Article I for the separation of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, the
General Assembly does not have the authority to do this. Conse-
quently, the 1972 amendment is to be given prospective effect
only. 6
The court did not controvert the Legislature's plenary power to
amend the retaliatory statute;66 it merely recognized that "a judi-
cial interpretation of a statute is determinative of its meaning
61. The National Old Line court used language similar to that of Southern Farm to
reach this result:
If similar investment credit is not authorized by the foreign state, then South
Carolina must retaliate since the taxes imposed by a foreign state on a South
Carolina insurer are greater than the taxes imposed by South Carolina on the
foreign insurer. We think the trial judge properly ... [required] the insurance
company to pay an additional amount to the Commissioner so that it will pay
the same amount which a South Carolina insurer is required to pay to the State
of Arkansas.
262 S.C. at 627, 207 S.E.2d at 77.
62. The court's decision in Southern Farm was filed on April 24, 1972, and the gover-
nor signed the amendment to the retaliatory statute approximately three months later on
July 14, 1972.
63. See note 47 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
65. 262 S.C. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 77-78.
66. Id. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 78. See Boatwright v. McElmurray, 247 S.C. 199, 146
S.E.2d 716 (1966).
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and effect" until subsequently amended by legislative enact-
ment."
Justices Brailsford and Bussey dissented,68 claiming that the
1972 amendment to the retaliatory statute should be given retro-
active effect. The dissent conceded that the amendment's decla-
ratory language could not be given effect as a construction of the
pre-amendment retaliatory statute in the face of the court's prior
decision. 9 Instead, the dissent argued that the 1972 amendment
authorized retrospective calculation of license taxes for years
prior to its adoption. 0 By construing the amendment as express-
ing legislative intent to remit a portion of the taxes due under the
retaliatory statute, the dissent concluded that no constitutional
mandate concerning the separation of legislative and judicial
powers would be violated.71 Although the dissent correctly noted
that Southern Farm did not prevent the General Assembly from
enacting a rebate or remittance of prior taxes, the language of the
enactment clearly does not call for such a remittance. The swift-
ness with which the Legislature acted72 and the declaratory lan-
guage of the enactment" make it manifest that the General As-
sembly intended to reverse the court's decision in Southern Farm.
Moreover, the retaliatory statute and its subsequent amendment
should have been strictly construed. The dissent tacitly admits
that its construction of the amendment is strained when admit-
ting that the declaratory language of the enactment was "inap-
propriate."7
67. 262 S.C. at 629, 207 S.E.2d at 78. Accord, McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35
S.E.2d 144 (1945). In McCutcheon, the petitioner brought an action to obtain civil service
status from Fulton County authorities after her discharge as a county employee. The court
had determined that, on the effective date of the Georgia Civil Service Act, the petitioner
was not an employee under the Act and could not be accorded the status of an incumbent.
The Georgia Legislature subsequently passed an act purporting to amend the Civil Service
Act by declaring that the named petitioner was entitled to such status. The Georgia
Supreme Court concluded that the special legislation was a legislative attempt to construe
its former act and, consequently, an attempt by the Legislature to perform a judicial
function.
68. 262 S.C. 621, 629-30, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78-79 (1974).
69. Id. at 630, 207 S.E.2d at 78.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 630, 207 S.E.2d at 78-79.
72. See note 62 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
75. 262 S.C. at 630, 207 S.E.2d at 78.
[Vol. 27
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The willingness of the dissent to strain construction of the
enactment to allow National a lesser tax burden is consistent with
the dissenters' opinion in Southern Farm. In the 1972 decision,
both Justices Brailsford and Bussey were convinced that the
credit allowances enacted by the Legislature 6 were essential to
the favorable position which South Carolina securities enjoyed on
the bond market and that the majority's interpretation of the
retaliatory statute would be harmful to such position." Regard-
less of the correctness or incorrectness of this view,"8 the dissent
in National Old Line has read too much into the 1972 amendment
of the retaliatory statute. If the Legislature had intended to enact
a remittance, it should have done so in plain terms. 9
IV. POLICY PROVISIONS
A. Replacement Vehicle
As a practical matter, automobile liability insurance is a
76. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-123 (Cum. Supp. 1973) and 37-125 (1962). See notes 51-52
supra.
77. Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 281-82, 188 S.E.2d
374, 378 (1972). The dissent argued that the objectives of the retaliatory statute and the
investment credit statutes should be given equal effect. They suggested a proper reading
of the retaliatory statute would be as follows:
The burden imposed upon South Carolina insurance companies in Mississippi
is exactly the same as that imposed upon Mississippi companies in this State,
i.e., a tax or license fee equal to 3% of the premiums collected within the State.
This meets the equality "license fees" demanded by the retaliatory statute.
That South Carolina sees fit, in furtherance of an entirely different policy, to
allow a Mississippi company the opportunity to earn a credit against this tax
by making South Carolina investments does not result in inequality within the
meaning of the retaliatory statute. Surely it is not South Carolina policy to
induce all states to allow investment tax credit to foreign insurance companies
equivalent to that allowed here. If this should come to pass, the competitive
advantage which we now enjoy in marketing bonds would inevitably vanish.
Id. But see Republic Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 272 Minn. 325, 138 N.W.2d
776 (1965).
78. In Southern Farm the insurance company admitted that the creation of good will
and the necessity for diversification were also considerations dictating investment of re-
serves in the states in which it did business. Brief for Appellant at 13, Lindsay v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972). Moreover, 82 percent of
foreign insurance investments in South Carolina are made by insurers whose domiciliary
states tax South Carolina corporations at a rate equivalent or lower than the South
Carolina rates and would not be affected by the decision. 258 S.C. at 279, 188 S.E.2d at
377. Of the remaining foreign insurers, most would still be encouraged to invest up to 75
percent of their reserves in South Carolina securities.
79. See State v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 254 S.C. 286, 175 S.E.2d 203 (1970).
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system of insuring vehicles rather than drivers."0 Coverage of the
basic automobile insurance policy centers around a named vehi-
cle. Omnibus clauses" often expand coverage to include use of the
named automobile by other persons in specified circumstances. 2
To the extent that insurance coverage under "newly acquired
automobile" clauses expand coverage to named insureds while
driving other automobiles, automobile insurance policies also in-
sure persons. In Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Richardson83 and
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 84
the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted similar policy pro-
visions expanding insurance coverage to named insureds driving
newly acquired automobiles.
In Stonewall the insurer brought an action to determine the
extent of its liability under an automobile insurance policy. The
policy in question was a standard form policy issued to Gerald
Richardson as the named insured and covered a described 1967
Chevrolet Camaro automobile. The policy contained the usual
provision that excluded coverage of any other vehicles owned by
or furnished for the regular use of the named insured. 5 One provi-
sion 8 did, however, extend coverage to a newly acquired automo-
80. R. KE ON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(b) (1971).
81. The omnibus clause usually appears in the "persons insured" or "definition of
insured" provisions of a policy. Regardless of where the clause is placed, its effect is to
expand coverage to persons driving the named automobile with the permission or implied
consent of the named insured. Id. § 4.7(a).
82. Id. § 4.9(b).
83. 261 S.C. 595, 201 S.E.2d 743 (1974).
84. 262 S.C. 110, 202 S.E.2d 640 (1974).
85. The applicable provision provided:
V. Use of Other Automobiles ....
(c) This insuring agreement does not apply:
(1) to any automobile owned by or furnished for regular use to
either the named insured or a member of the same household other
than a private chauffeur or domestic servant of such named in-
sured or spouse;
(2) to any accident arising out of the operation of an automobile
sales agency, repair shop, service station, storage garage or public
parking place;
(3) to any automobile while used in a business or occupation of
such named insured or spouse except a private passenger automo-
bile operated or occupied by such named insured, spouse, private
chauffeur or domestic servant.
Record at 31-32, Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 261 S.C. 595, 201 S.E.2d 743 (1974).
86. The policy provision read:
(4) Newly Acquired Automobile-an automobile, ownership of which is ac-
17
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bile if it replaced the automobile specifically described in the
policy. In February 1968, the insured's automobile was involved
in a collision and rendered inoperable.87 Although the insured
retained title to the wrecked automobile in his name and contin-
ued payments on it," the insured purchased a 1962 Ford Falcon
automobile which was involved in another accident in April
1968. s9 The insurer denied coverage, claiming that the policy cov-
ered only the Camaro automobile over which the insured contin-
ued to exercise rights of ownership, including the right of immedi-
ate possession."
In rejecting the insurer's claim that retained ownership and
replacement are mutually exclusive terms, the lower court found
that
[t]he evidence in this case clearly supports the fact that the
1962 Ford Falcon was a replacement vehicle for the wrecked
1967 Chevrolet. The fact that Richardson retained title and even
made further payments on the car is not significant. If he had
owed nothing on the 1967 Chevrolet and it was a total loss as
he seemed to think, he may have retained title and ownership
permanently because it had no sale or salvage value. This
should not affect a vehicle obtained as a replacement.'
quired by the named insured or his spouse if a resident of the same household,
if (i) it replaces an automobile owned by either and covered by this policy, or
the company insures all automobiles owned by the named insured and such
spouse on the date of its delivery, and (ii) the named insured or such spouse
notifies the company within thirty days following such delivery date; but such
notice is not acquired if the newly acquired automobile replaces an owned auto-
mobile covered by this policy. The insurance with respect to the newly acquired
automobile does not apply to any loss against which the named insured or such
spouse has other valid and collectible insurance. The named insured shall pay
any additional premium required because of the application of the insurance to
such newly acquired automobile.
Record at 31.
87. The parties stipulated: "That from the date of the accident in February 1968 until
June 11, 1968, when the said Chevrolet was repossessed by General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, the said Chevrolet was not used by Gerald Richardson and on April 21, 1968,
it was inoperable." Record at 9.
88. Richardson was negotiating with his collision carrier as to whether he should have
the Camaro repaired. Brief for Appellant at 3. See also Record at 25-28.
89. During the pendency of the present suit, tort actions arising out of the second
accident were reduced to judgment against the named insured. These judgment creditors
were made parties to the suit. Brief for Appellant at 2.
90. Brief for Appellant at 6. The insurer claimed that the insured was required to give
the company notice within 30 days for the Falcon to be covered under the "newly acquired
automobile" clause of its policy. See note 85 supra.
91. Record at 34.
1975]
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The supreme court affirmed the lower court decision without sig-
nificant comment.2 In so doing, the court left unanswered the
question of exactly what constitutes a replacement vehicle and
whether retention of title to a wrecked automobile which has
significant salvage value precludes coverage of a newly acquired
automobile when notice requirements are not satisfied.
In Allstate the supreme court was faced with a factual situa-
tion similar to that in Stonewall. Government Employees issued
a policy of automobile liability insurance to the named insured
covering a 1961 Chevrolet automobile. The policy contained a
provision which automatically extended coverage to any subse-
quently acquired replacement vehicle. A replacement vehicle was
defined as
a private passenger, farm or utility automobile ownership of
which is acquired by the named insured during the policy pe-
riod, provided
(1) it replaces an owned vehicle as defined in (a) above,
or
(2) the company insures all private passenger, farm and
utility vehicles owned by the named insured on the date
of such acquisition and the named insured notifies the
company within 30 days after the date of such acquisition
of his election to make this and no other policy issued by
the company applicable to such automobile .... 11
The automobile described in the policy became inoperable
because of mechanical failure and the insured bought another
1961 Chevrolet automobile. The original insured automobile re-
mained in the insured's possession, "jacked up on some cinder
blocks" and without tires at his home. 4 The second Chevrolet
also became inoperable because of mechanical failure and the
insured purchased a third 1961 Chevrolet.
The third Chevrolet was involved in an accident when the
insured struck a pedestrian whose insurance company subse-
quently brought an action to determine whether it was liable
under the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy or whether
92. The court merely noted that "[t]he finding of the trial judge that the Ford
Falcon, purchased ... to replace the inoperable Chevrolet Camaro, is fully sustained by
the evidence." 262 S.C. at 598, 201 S.E.2d at 744.
93. Brief for Appellant at Appendix, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 262 S.C. 110, 202 S.E.2d 640 (1974).
94. 262 S.C. at 115, 202 S.E.2d at 642.
[Vol. 27
19
et al.: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
INSURANCE
Government Employees' replacement provisions covered the op-
eration of insured's third Chevrolet.15 The trial court ruled that
both the second and third Chevrolets were replacement vehicles
and held the insurer liable under its replacement provisions. The
lower court relied upon the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
South Carolina law to define "replacement vehicle" in broad
terms:
The replacement vehicle is one the ownership of which has been
acquired after the issuance of the policy and during the policy
period and it must replace the car described in the policy, which
must be disposed of or be incapable of further service at the time
of replacement."
In applying this definition to the facts in the present case, the
trial court cited with approval the "landmark decision in this
area ' 97 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Merchant Mu-
tual Casualty Co. v. Lambert." In Lambert the court held that a
new car was a replacement vehicle where the insured retained
possession of the named automobile in his garage for several
months because it was worn out and unfit to be driven.
During the appeal from the trial court's decision, the insurer
pointed to testimony of the insured that he intended to repair the
original Chevrolet automobile.9 Consequently, the company
maintained that affirmance of the trial court would "allow an
insured to have double coverage while only paying one premium,
and this clearly would be a windfall for the insured.""1 ' The su-
preme court affirmed the holding of the trial court and added that
95. To complicate the issues further, the insured had notified the company of the
purchases of the second and third Chevrolets. Although the evidence was not conclusive,
the insured apparently considered each new purchase as a replacement vehicle but the
insurer included the second car in the original policy. Prior to the date of the accident,
the insurer had cancelled the insured's policy for failure to pay an "additional coverage"
premium on the second Chevrolet. The insured claimed no knowledge of the cancellation
and the insurer readily admitted that the third Chevrolet which was involved in the
accident was a replacement vehicle for the second Chevrolet; it denied, however, that the
second Chevrolet replaced the first Chevrolet. Id. at 116, 202 S.E.2d at 643.
96. Record at 97, citing Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 388 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.
1967).
97, Id.
98, 90 N.H. 507, 11 A.2d 361 (1940).
99. The opposing insurer argued that the insured's intention to repair the original
vehicle did not disqualify the subsequent replacement of the automobile and indicated
that the insured's testimony reveals that any intention to repair the original automobile
was abandoned when the second car was purchased. See note 102 infra and accompanying
text.
100. Brief for Appellant at 20,
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[m]ere retention of title and possession of the described auto-
mobile will not prevent the attachment of replacement coverage
to one subsequently acquired, where the described automobile
is incapable of further service. '
The court noted that the record clearly indicated that once the
original and second automobiles suffered mechanical failures,
they were never again operated. Moreover, the court implied that
any intention of the insured to repair these vehicles was aban-
doned because it was "reasonably inferrable that the same model
vehicles were purchased so that parts could be taken from the
inoperable one to keep the replacement operating." '
The intent to repair the original Chevrolet automobile was
of great concern to the insurer because of its unusual replacement
provision which automatically extended coverage to replacement
vehicles without any requirement of notice." 3 The insurer feared
that an insured who had obtained an additional automobile
would be permitted
to crystallize to ...[his] own advantage an intention which
up to the time of the accident had been embryonic and perhaps
never communicated to another party. If allowed, the insurance
company would in effect be covering two cars in one policy with
the enhanced possibility of liability. '
Since this fear is largely attributable to the poor draftsmanship
of its own policy provision, the insurer has the ability to correct
its error in subsequent policies."0 5 Additionally, the insurer's fear
101. 262 S.C. at 115, 202 S.E.2d at 642. See Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
383 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1967); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45, 108
S.E.2d 49 (1959). The court distinguished its former decision in Miller v. Stuyvesant Ins.
Co., 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913 (1963), which involved the transfer of an insured vehicle
from a husband to his wife. The court felt that the subsequent purchase of another car
by the husband was not a replacement vehicle because it was still operative and within
the possession and ownership of the husband as a member of his wife's household. See
also Mitcham v. Travelers Indem. Co., 127 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1942) (replacement coverage
not extended where insured purchased a new car and left the original vehicle with an
automobile dealer to be stored and sold since a lien prevented the outright transfer of title
to the automobile dealer); Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th
Cir. 1965) (replacement coverage denied where insured transferred the named vehicle to
her son but continued to operate the original and new vehicles).
102. 262 S.C. at 115, 202 S.E.2d at 642-43. See note 99 supra.
103. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
104. Brief for Appellant at 15, quoting Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.
Supp. 978, 981 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
105. See note 86 supra. Merely because the terms of its own policy may be unfavora-
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is ungrounded; an insured would gain no benefit by virtue of
possession of an automobile which is incapable of service and the
insurer's risk of an inoperative automobile being involved in an
accident is remote. If an original automobile were repaired and
made operative, courts would probably be inclined to limit cover-
age either solely to the replacement vehicle or to the original
vehicle, depending on the facts of the particular case."6
B. Change of Interest or Ownership
In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 10 the South Carolina Supreme Court, in a case of
first impression, determined that a lienholder's repossession of an
automobile did not constitute a change of interest or ownership
in the automobile sufficient to require notice to the insurer. 0 A
consumer, John Davis, was a named insured under a policy issued
by State Farm which insured an automobile purchased from a
Seneca, South Carolina dealer. Davis had financed his purchase
through a retail installment contract which the dealer had sold
to Chrysler Credit. The policy, naming Chrysler Credit as lien-
holder and loss payee, contained State Farm's standard lien-
holder provision which required Chrysler Credit to notify the in-
surer within ten days of any change of interest or ownership if the
policy were to remain in full effect. '
ble to the insurer, the court has little reason to interpret such provision adverse to the
party who did not intend to have more than one vehicle insured.
106. If the original automobile were repaired, it probably could not be classified as a
replacement vehicle although, if title is not in the insured, it may be classified as a
temporary substitute vehicle. In Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 383 F.2d 145, 149
(4th Cir. 1967), the court indicated that the insurer's fears of double coverage have not
yet been realized under the application of the rule adopted in Allstate: "We have been
referred to no case holding that an insured may own and operate both the replaced and
the replacement vehicle for more than one month and then elect, without notice to his
insurer, to have the replacement occur when he disposes of the older vehicle." See note
101 supra.
107. 263 S.C. 70, 207 S.E.2d 806 (1974).
108. Id. at 76, 207 S.E.2d at 809.
109. The policy provision in question provided as follows:
Lienholder: If a mortgage owner, conditional vendor, or assignee is named in the
exceptions, loss, if any, under coverage D, F, and G shall be payable to the
named insured and to such additional interest as such interest may appear, and
this insurance as to such additional interest shall not be invalidated by any act
or negligence of the mortgagor or owner, nor by any change in title or ownership,
nor by any error or inadvertence in the description of the motor vehicle until
after notice of termination of the policy shall be given to such mortgage owner,
1975]
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Davis defaulted in his installment payments and advised
Chrysler Credit that he no longer wanted the automobile and did
not intend to make further payments. The finance company
thereupon requested Davis to return the automobile to the dealer.
Davis returned the automobile, together with the keys and regis-
tration, on the following day. After confirming that the automo-
bile had been returned and advising its home office, Chrysler
Credit notified Davis of its intention to dispose of the automobile
in 10 days at a public sale unless Davis redeemed the vehicle prior
to the sale. Before the public sale occurred, the automobile was
stolen from the dealer's lot. State Farm denied coverage, claiming
that Chrysler Credit failed to comply with policy provisions re-
quiring notice within 10 days of a change of interest or ownership.
In a trial without a jury, the lower court ruled that no change
of interest or ownership had occurred and awarded Chrysler
Credit the unpaid balance on the installment contract. In affirm-
ing the lower court, the supreme court rejected State Farm's con-
tention that a transfer of title from debtor to lienholder consti-
tuted a change in ownership by operation of law. At one time,
South Carolina courts recognized that a mortgage of personal
property automatically transferred title to the property to the
mortgagee."' Such a rule proved to be harsh and resulted in ine-
quities; later, modification led to a new rule whereby title to
mortgaged property would revert to the mortgagee or lienholder
only upon default of the debtor."' State Farm claimed that this
rule was unaffected by adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code"' and claimed that Davis' default automatically transferred
conditional vendor, mortgagee, or assignee stating when not less than ten days
thereafter such termination shall be effective; provided, the lienholder shall
notify the company within 10 days of any change of interest or ownership which
shall come to the knowledge of said lienholder and failure to do so will render
this policy null and void.
Record at 12, Chrysler Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 263 S.C. 70, 207
S.E.2d 806 (1974) (emphasis added).
110. See Levi v. Legg & Bell, 23 S.C. 282 (1885).
111. See Martin v. Jenkins, 51 S.C. 42, 27 S.E. 947 (1897). Despite reversion of title
upon default, the mortgagor retained some rights of ownership.
After breach of the condition of a mortgage of personal property the legal title
to the property mortgaged becomes vested in the mortgagee, subject only to the
right of the mortgagor to redeem before sale, or, after sale, to an accounting in
equity for the surplus, if any, over the debt secured by the mortgage.
Id. at 43, 27 S.E. at 948.
112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-202 (Spec. Supp. 1966) (Reporter's Comments).
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title to Chrysler Credit and required Chrysler Credit to notify
State Farm of the subsequent change in ownership.
The court correctly viewed State Farm's construction of the
term "change in ownership" as strained.113 Since the policy provi-
sion in question had not been written in a vacuum, the court
determined that the insurer should be presumed to have had
knowledge of the statutory relationship between a debtor and
lienholder and the legal incidents thereof. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code,1 4 which clearly governed the relationship between
Davis and Chrysler Credit, clearly recognized that the issue of
title to the automobile was irrelevant: "Each provision of this
Title with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies
whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the
debtor." '  Moreover, both the Code1  and the common law17
recognize that a mortgagee is not free to exercise absolute rights
of ownership over personal property when a default occurs. In-
stead, ownership remains in the debtor with his right of redemp-
tion.1
18
The term "change of interest" has a much broader meaning
than "change of ownership." It includes an alteration of any
right, legal or equitable, in the nature of property.' State Farm
argued that, even if no change in ownership had occurred, Chrys-
ler Credit's possession of the automobile, subject only to Davis'
right of redemption, constituted a change of interest within the
meaning of the policy terms.' 2 The court, however, noted that
both the lienholder and the debtor retained insurable interests in
the automobile and no third party interest was interjected into
the insurance contract.121 If the automobile had been stolen before
default and prior to repossession, Chrysler Credit's interest in the
automobile would have been identical to the interest which it was
presently asserting.
113. 263 S.C. at 76, 207 S.E.2d at 809.
114. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-101 et seq. (Spec. Supp. 1966).
115. Id. § 10.9-202.
116. Id. § 10.9-504(3) (requiring reasonable notification to the debtor of the time and
place of sale) and § 10.9-506 (recognizing the right of the debtor to redeem the property
before sale unless otherwise agreed in writing).
117. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hanahan, 146 S.C. 257, 143 S.E. 820
(1928).
118. See note 111 supra.
119. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Deas, 229 Ala. 477, 158 So. 323 (1935).
120. Brief for Appellant at 8.
121. 263 S.C. at 75, 207 S.E.2d at 808.
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Adoption of State Farm's contention that default under a
chattel mortgage or installment contract 2 ' constitutes an auto-
matic change of ownership requiring notice to the insurer would
lead to impractical results.
[To so hold would place an intolerable burden upon financiers
of automobiles and would result in the forfeiture of rights of
financiers in many instances when a payment is late for a period
in excess of ten days. Yet, carried to its extreme, this. . . is the
position of [State Farm] . . . .
In view of the impracticality of such a construction and State
Farm's knowledge of the legal relationship between a debtor and
lienholder, the insurer should have specified that its policy provi-
sion applied to situations of default or repossession. 2
Chrysler Credit's possession of the automobile did not consti-
tute a sufficient change of interest or ownership which would
justify forfeiture of the policy. "[T]he obvious purpose of the
required notification is to enable the insurer to determine
whether the transfer has increased the hazard" to the insured
property.' The mere transfer of possession of the automobile
from Davis to Chrysler Credit did not involve an increased risk
or hazard. "[The vehicle was taken off the road and placed on
a dealer's lot . .. [where] the risks . . .were decreased as the
122. A chattel mortgage under South Carolina common law and a conditional sales
contract are functional equivalents. See Speizman v. Guill, 202 S.C. 498, 25 S.E.2d 731
(1943).
123. Brief for Respondent at 5-6.
124. 263 S.C. at 76, 207 S.E.2d at 809. See Anderson v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
57 N.D. 462, 222 N.W. 609 (1928).
125. Mutual Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 248 S.C. 272, 281, 149
S.E.2d 633, 637 (1966). But see Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. ex tel. First Nat'l Bank v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 166 Tenn. 126, 128, 59 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1933):
Again it is insisted that there is nothing to show that the conveyance complained
of increased the hazard. But the mortgage clause provided for notice of a change
whether the hazard was thereby increased in fact or not. A contract of insurance
is a contract personal in its nature, and the insurer has the right to determine
for itself whether it shall become obligated to a grantee of the assured or not.
State Farm attempted to distinguish Mutual because the policy provision in that case was
not an absolute prohibition against a change in ownership or interest. Brief for Appellant
at 9. Such a distinction is illusory because the insured premises in Mutual were transferred
from the named insured to her husband. No increased risk or hazard was thereby incurred.
Moreover, the policy terms were conditioned on any one of the three criteria: a change of
ownership, a change of interest, or an increased hazard. Phoenix, however, .is clearly
distinguishable from the present case because it involved a transfer to a third party. See
text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
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car was no longer being driven on the highways. ' 28
Although never applied to movable personal property, simi-
lar lienholder/mortgagee clauses in fire insurance policies cover-
ing real property have been held to be separate and distinct con-
tracts between the insurer and mortgagee. 12 Consequently, provi-
sions dealing with a change of interest or ownership apply only
to strangers to the insurance contract.128 At the time the insurance
contract was made, the insurer knew the identity of the mortga-
gee and passed some judgment upon the hazard of insuring that
interest. In Federal Land Bank v. Agricultural Insurance Co.121
the South Carolina Supreme Court indicated that a provision
concerning notice of any change of interest or ownership relates
to a sale to a third party and not to a foreclosure by the mortga-
gee. 30 The only distinction between clauses in fire insurance con-
tracts and automobile insurance contracts is the mobility of the
personal property. Since the insurer is well aware of such a dis-
tinction, the insurer should clearly indicate that a "change of
ownership or interest" provision applies to mere possession or
custody of the property.13' Only when possession ripens into own-
ership through an actual sale and passage of title to the purchaser
does a change in interest occur.
132
126. Record at 15. State Farm argued that removal to a dealer's lot increased the risk
of vandalism or theft. Brief for Appellant at 8. This argument was, however, weakened
by the lack of evidence that vandalism or theft is more prevalent on a dealer's lot than in
private driveways or public streets. On the other hand, common experience justifies the
view that cars which remain on private lots are not subject to highway accidents.
127. Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
128. Id.
129. 172 S.C. 109, 173 S.E. 295 (1934).
130. The decision in Federal Land Bank was grounded on other considerations. The
bank insisted on an additional clause in the insurance policy specifying that, upon a
transfer of ownership to the bank, the bank would be required to notify the insurance
company. Since the bank authored the provision, the court felt the bank was bound to a
strict interpretation of its terms and decided the case accordingly.
131. Brief for Respondent at 6.
132. Walradt v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 N.Y. 375, 32 N.E. 1063 (1893); W. VANCE & B.
ANDERSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF INsURANcE 836 (3d ed. 1951). But see C.I.T. Corp.
v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 673, 64 P.2d 742 (1937) where the California
Supreme Court faced a similar factual situation. C.I.T. Corporation, an automobile finan-
cier, purchased the conditional sales contract of one Housley from a dealer. Housley had
used an old truck as a down payment on the purchase price of a new truck. When it was
discovered that Housley did not possess title to the used truck, C.I.T. ordered repossession
of the collateral which was subsequently stolen from the dealer's lot. In allowing the
insurer to prevail, the court claimed that repossession terminated the debtor's interest and
altered that of the lienholder who had reassumed the risk of loss. These results, however,
were controlled by the conditional sales contract which expressly terminated Housley's
interest upon repossession. Since there was a breach of warranty of title, Housley's con-
tract was cancelled and he could no longer claim any right of redemption. 26
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